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Abstract: We examine the effect of war on state fiscal capacity in developing
countries, measured by tax revenue to GDP ratios. In divided or factionalised
societies, patronage may substitute for common interest public goods, with the
possibility of violent contestation over a rent. Our dynamic panel empirical estimates of the determinants of fiscal capacity are applied to 79 developing countries, during 1980–2010. Results indicate that war, especially civil war, retards
fiscal capacity, along with poor governance, oil dependence and macroeconomic
mismanagement.
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The functions of the state are important in maintaining societal cohesion and
sustaining the social contract between rulers and ruled. Besides a legitimate
Weberian monopoly over violence, a functioning state must be able to enforce
laws, property rights and contracts, as well as have the capacity to raise revenues and provide public goods (Mill 1848). A modern state must also be able
to provide a wider range of public goods (health, education for example), in
addition to a capacity to regulate markets. More affluent nations have bigger
governments (World Bank 2010), as measured by the share of government consumption in national income. Economic decline in ‘failing’ states undermines
the state’s fiscal capacity. Furthermore, a ‘failing’ state’s ability to guarantee
personal security, property rights and laws is seriously compromised, leading
to the gradual privatisation of violence between predatory and defensive elements within society. Individuals rely on kinship based groups and warlords
for security and public good provision; this in turn heightens the risk of civil
war as society descends towards an anarchical state. In the contemporary
developing world the lack of fiscal/state capacity enhances civil war risk; civil
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war in turn further attenuates fiscal capacity by undermining pre-existing
fiscal institutions. State capacity is also essential for sustained growth with
equity, which is the major challenge for developing countries. This requires
that the state is able to command resources for its activities and public goods
provision.
Curiously, war may have facilitated the development of state capacity in
Europe since the 15th century (Tilly 1992). Gradually, as wars became increasingly complex, requiring larger forces which had to be maintained for longer
periods, other sources of finance (newer taxes or borrowing) had to be explored
and invented. Increased taxation and conscription compelled rulers to make
concessions to wider sections of the population. This meant more representative government, augmentation of state activities towards regulating production, manipulating distribution, providing social protection; in short more and
more public goods. A history of making war against a nation’s common external
enemies may lay the foundations for future state capacity, and assist nation building, as it lays the basis for fiscal and legal institutions. This process, however, may
not apply to internal conflict, which often undermines institutions, and interest
in the provision of public goods.
Many developing countries commenced their post-colonial existence with
reasonable institutions and state capacity. The last quarter of the 20th century,
however, witnessed growth and development failure in many parts of the developing world, especially in Africa. Associated with these developments, state
capacity has declined, and several of these nations have also experienced civil
war, which is widely believed to attenuate state capacity even further. Other
developing countries, including those not experiencing civil war, are characterized by factional politics, with governments, even democratically elected
ones, serving particular group interests. These states have little interest in providing common interest public goods to its entire citizenry, but will, instead,
concentrate on using the state’s resources to reward their own faction via political patronage. Patronage substitutes for wide ranging public goods. Thus, state
capacity as measured by government expenditure as a proportion of national
income may be low, but tax revenues as a share of national income will certainly
be smaller in factionalized states where patronage is widespread; the state may
also rely on overseas aid and its ability to directly command resources, royalties
and rents for revenues.
We empirically analyze the effect of war, whose dominant form nowadays
is civil war, on the fiscal capacity of the state in the contemporary developing
world (between 1980 and 2010), measured by the tax/GDP ratio, which is our
dependent variable. We do not look at government expenditure, because total
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state spending may be financed not only by taxation and borrowing, but also
direct access to rents, royalties, state trading monopolies and foreign aid.
The state may also rely on inflation taxes, and manipulate the exchange rate
to capture more resources for itself (we proxy this via a dual exchange rate variable). The rationale for using per capita GDP as one of the control variables is
because richer nations tend to have better scores in governance indicators, and
more solid and mature fiscal institutions.
We capture the nature of the state through governance variables. A poorly
governed state, with weak institutions will have less fiscal capacity. The indicators of economic freedom (EFI from Gwartney and Lawson 2011) capture the likely
impact of governance in the context of risk and prudential regulation prevailing in that country. They not only show how governments are elected, monitored
and replaced, but also their capacity to formulate and implement public policies effectively as well as the attitude of the electorate and their representatives
toward the institutions that govern economic, political, and social interactions.
The conflict data are from UCDP (Themnér and Wallensteen 2011). Depending on
the intensity of the conflict, we allow for three conflict categories: Low, Medium,
and High corresponding to the alpha-numeric ranking 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
An important complication in empirically studying the impact of conflict
on state capacity is the potential for endogeneity biases, reverse causation, and
omitted variables. We try to address these concerns by using country and time
fixed effects. In order to address biases due to reverse causality, we run regressions
lagging all regressors one period, and we conduct dynamic system Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) estimations, using lagged regressors as instruments.
We test our model on a sample of 79 countries. The choice of countries is
determined by the availability of consistent data on all the variables. The analysis
uses a panel data set with data averaged over 5-year periods from 1980 to 2010.
Full details can be found in Chowdhury and Murshed (2013).
A selection of some of the regression results in Chowdhury and Murshed
(2013) are presented in Table 1. The presence of conflict is found to be costly
in terms of a long-run reduction in fiscal capacity. Hence, any policy measures
that would reduce the intensity of conflict would go a long way in enhancing the
revenue capability in the developing countries. Dual (distorted) exchange rates,
inflation and openness all impact negatively and significantly on tax capacity. We
also examine the impact of ethnic fractionalisation on the state’s fiscal capacity
by including an index of ethno-linguistic fragmentation (Alesina et al. 2003). In
column 3 of Table 1, the variable turns out to be negative and statistically significant. We also add an oil and gas exporter dummy; oil exporting countries appear
less dependent on domestic resource mobilization.
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Table 1: System GMM estimation results: ethnicity & oil and gas exporter dummy.
Variable

Base
equation

Ethnicity

Ethnicity

Oil/Gas

Oil/Gas

Constant
12.24 (6.20)
6.22 (3.45)
Conflict
–1.84 (5.63)
–
Log(GDP PC)
0.54 (3.74)
0.45 (2.68)
log(GDP)
0.78 (2.94)
2.44 (5.34)
Inflation
–1.20 (4.12) –0.65 (2.65)
Dual ex rate
–1.33 (4.59) –0.87 (3.90)
Trade
–0.49 (3.23) –1.54 (4.10)
EFI
3.90 (7.42)
2.35 (5.54)
Ethnicity
– –0.74 (1.11)
Oil/Gas dummy
–
–
Africa*conflict
–0.08 (2.00) –0.43 (3.72)
Ethnicity*conflict
–
0.65 (1.45)
Oil/Gas*conflict
–
–
0.06
0.10
1st order serial corr.
(p-value)
2nd order serial corr.
0.43
0.22
(p-value)
Years indicator
Yes
Yes
Country fixed effect
Yes
Yes
AR(1) p-value
0.014
0.009
AR(2) p-value
0.336
0.190
Hansen test for
14.68 (0.18) 13.11 (0.17)
Overidentifying
restrictions (p-value)
Sargan test (p-value)
0.26
0.12
Difference Sargan
0.24
0.19
test (p-value)
Number of countries
79
79
Number of
510
510
observations

7.15 (3.91)
–
0.64 (3.14)
1.80 (3.96)
–1.02 (4.40)
–1.15 (4.16)
–0.63 (3.80)
2.40 (6.60)
–0.82 (2.04)
–
–0.36 (2.14)
–
–
0.04

4.70 (2.56)
–
0.31 (2.96)
1.98 (5.76)
–1.50 (3.70)
–1.12 (4.39)
–0.76 (3.87)
2.75 (6.10)
–
–1.12 (3.46)
–0.64 (3.65)
–
–0.18 (2.35)
0.10

3.66 (2.90)
–
0.70 (3.03)
1.04 (3.80)
–1.94 (3.70)
–1.35 (3.66)
–0.85 (2.38)
1.80 (4.33)
–
–2.64 (4.15)
–0.49 (3.04)
–
–
0.07

0.18

0.27

0.34

Yes
Yes
0.008
0.236
12.84 (.12)

Yes
Yes
0.011
0.202
9.35 (0.11)

Yes
Yes
0.017
0.226
11.14 (0.13)

0.17
0.20

0.12
0.22

0.17
0.22

79
510

76
480

76
480

Figures in parentheses after the coefficient estimates are the absolute values of the t-statistics.

We find that war, which is dominantly civil war, does not promote the fiscal
capacity of the state in contemporary developing countries, unlike the findings
of Charles Tilly for inter-state war in European history. This may be attributable
to the destructive influence of civil war on political and economic institutions,
as well as the possibility that civil war is symptom of the lack of common interest public goods. Ultimately, however, Charles Tilly may have got it right – state
building remains a quasi-criminal activity – a process which may not necessitate
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the development of fiscal capacity as long as alternative sources of coercive
resource extraction remain available to those who govern.
Previously published online November 9, 2013
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